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Is Business Ethics Necessary?
Craig Ehrlich*
I. INTRODUCTION
Written on the eve of the new millennium, an article about the ethi-
cal challenges of business stated that business has a series of responsi-
bilities to society. The first is the profit making function, an essential
ingredient in a free enterprise economy. The second is the responsi-
bility to obey the law. The third is that, "[i]n addition to fulfilling their
economic and legal responsibilities, businesses are expected to fulfill
ethical responsibilities as well."' What might these ethical responsibil-
ities be? The author gave no examples. Almost 20 years ago, another
writer described business ethics issues as including "pollution, ade-
quate wages and benefits, safe, even pleasant working conditions,
non-discriminatory personnel policies backed by appropriate recruit-
ment, training and even retraining programs, careful husbanding of
non-renewable resources, honest, informative advertising, [and] pro-
duction of safe durable products."' 2 A business which is following the
law and is concerned for its own long term profitability is probably
doing all of this. Morality limits the pursuit of self interest by creating
a duty to respect others, but self interest is already limited by the law,
and myopic self interest is limited by the fundamental business judg-
ment that sustainable long term gains will probably exceed those from
short term opportunism. What, then, is the domain of business ethics?
Those who teach law at business schools may be especially con-
cerned to know whether they are teaching useful knowledge or palat-
able euphemisms. The undergraduate and MBA business school
curriculum includes classes about business ethics. The materials are
taught by philosophers, ministers of religion and occasionally by law-
yers. The cases often involve defective products, trade secret misap-
propriation, employment issues, and the like, and the ethical analysis
tends to add little to the law. What a manager should do in these
* I am grateful for the many enlightening conversations with Terrence W. Mahoney, Esq., of
Boston.
1. Archie B Carroll, Ethical Challenges for Business in the New Millennium: Corporate Social
Responsibility and Models of Management Morality, 10 Bus. ETnics 0. 33, 36 (Jan. 2000) .
2. Paul F. Camenisch, Profit: Some Moral Reflections, J. oF Bus. ETHICS 225, 226 (1987).
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situations is answered fully, or almost fully, by the law. One has some
basis for concern about the preemption of specific business skills by an
amorphous concern for the well being of society.3
The great themes which this paper touches upon - self interest vs.
social responsibility, stockholder vs. stakeholder - have been written
about time and time again since at least the Berle - Dodd exchanges
of the 1930s4 and the stream of discourse shows no signs of abating. It
may be that I have one small contribution to make to the discussion.
Has anyone else asked, simply, whether business ethics is necessary?
Put another way, how, exactly, does an ethical manager behave differ-
ently than one who follows the law and is concerned for the long term
profitability of his business? A celebrated 1968 article in the Harvard
Business Review contended that "as long as a company does not
transgress the rules of the game set by law, it has the legal right to
shape its strategy without reference to anything but profits. ''5
The point that law and a long term view of profit will channel busi-
ness action towards the greater good is hardly a new one. Adam
Smith wrote, in "The Wealth of Nations," that in a free market people
usually produce goods desired by their neighbors and thereby pro-
mote the good of society.6 Professor Dodd noted the point in his 1932
article, yet still he urged the "development of a business ethics which
goes beyond the requirements of law and the dictates of enlightened
self-interest."' 7 He did not give examples of cases in which these
forces proved inadequate, but Dodd wrote at a time that predated the
employee, consumer, and environmental protections created and en-
forced by the modern regulatory state. He believed that business is
permitted by law only if it is "of service to the community ' 8 and that
society was undergoing a substantial change in public opinion - that
business should become a profession of public service and not simply
a source of profit for its owners.9 With respect it is questionable
whether he was right.
3. See, Marianne M Jennings, Are Business SchoolsAnti-Business?, ACROSS THE BOARD,
Mar./Apr. 2001, 28, 37.
4. A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932);
A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365
(1932).
5. Albert Z. Carr, IsBusinessBluffing Ethical?, HARVARD Bus. REV., 143, 149 (Jan/Feb 1968).
6. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
BOOK IV, CH.2, 423 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937).
7. Dodd, supra note 4, at 1161.
8. Id. at 1149.
9. Id. at 1153.
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Business, like any human activity, is permitted by our law simply
because it is not harmful. We do not require people to be of benefit to
themselves or to others, perhaps because the law does not presume to
know what is of benefit. We tend to leave people alone 10. Also, the
change in public opinion that Professor Dodd sensed has moved in a
different direction. Much new regulatory law has been put in place
since 1932 to protect the interests of employees and consumers and
this has supplanted the sense that the unrestrained pursuit of profit
ought to be mitigated by a sense of professionalism and public service.
The shareholder wealth norm - that a corporation is to be run for the
making of profit for its owners - is still the law, and the authority cited
by Professor Dodd in support of his view, "Business: A Profession,"
by Justice Brandeis, has been cited in only a few judicial opinions
since its publication in 1925. Indeed, the traditional professions have
themselves become more like ordinary businesses.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II explores the relationship
between business law and business ethics and concludes that many
ethical issues are resolvable by existing law. Part III considers the
need for a business operating in a competitive marketplace to behave
efficiently, and concludes that long run profit considerations will often
lead a firm to behave in a manner that most people find acceptable.
Parts IV and V consider the duty of loyalty that a corporate manager
owes to the stockholders and concludes that this precludes a manager
from pursuing an idiosyncratic moral mission. Part VI applies stan-
dard ethical analyses to the sale of internet censoring software to for-
eign governments to determine whether these are likely to aid a
manger in deciding how to act. Finally, part VII explores a handful of
other reasons why business managers should not become the guardi-
ans of the public good.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS LAW AND
BUSINESS ETHICS
The conventional view of the relationship between law and ethics,
and the foundation of the discipline called business ethics, is that
merely following the law does not exhaust a firm's ethical responsibili-
ties. What is legally required may not be ethically correct; and many
10. E.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971) (the vagrancy ordinance
case). So too, the law does not require that contracts be of benefit to society or even to the
immediate parties. A contract voluntarily entered into will be enforced even if it proves to have
been an unwise or foolish bargain.
2005]
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things required by ethics are not required by law.1 Thus, the Ameri-
can Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility is of the
view that "'corporate responsibility' also embraces behavior beyond
that demanded by minimum legal requirements. '12
While there is overlap, it is certainly true that law is not co-exten-
sive with ethics.13 An individual is under no legal duty to rescue an-
other who will surely die without the other's help, help that the other
might give easily and at no risk to herself.14 One who breaches a con-
tract need merely pay damages; hence the concept of an efficient
breach. While law may be the "conscience of the community" (some-
times said in closing argument to the jury), it is often amoral and prag-
matic. The Uniform Commercial Code embodies this dual nature. It
requires "good faith" in the performance of a contract, 15 which sounds
moralistic, 16 but the Code's overall purpose is to provide an infrastruc-
11. See generally Survey - Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good Company, THE ECONO-
MIST, January 22, 2005, at 20.
12. Preliminary Report of American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility,
July 16, 2002, at 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/preimi-
nary-report.pdf. What might these additional behaviors include? The Task Force gives no ex-
amples and refers the reader to section 2.01 of the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance, which is discussed in detail in section IV below.
13. William T Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporate Law, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1403 (1993) (characterizing the duty of loyalty as being "grounded in the moral order").
There are any number of similar examples: trade secret law is the embodiment of "commercial
morality," PepsiCo, Inc. v Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995), and consider the body of
equity jurisprudence, rooted in a moral sense of fairness based upon conscience. Yet, any ac-
count of the relationship between law and morals in American jurisprudence must include
Holmes's discussion of the bad man, the amoral actor who may still care to predict whether his
deeds will land him in prison, OW. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
Holmes announced in The Path of the Law that one of his goals was to "dispel a confu-
sion between morality and law." He added, "[w]hen I emphasize the difference be-
tween law and morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of learning and
understanding the law." Legal positivists from John Austin to Holmes (and Holmes'
alter ego, John Gray) to Hans Kelsen to H.L.A. Hart have, despite their differences,
treated the separation of law and morals as the defining characteristic of positivism.
Lon Fuller and other critics of positivism have accepted the positivists' formulation of
the issue, although they have maintained that law and morals cannot be separated.
Albert W. Altschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later,
49 FLA. L. REV 353, 380-81 (1997).
14. See. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL Dis-
COURSE, 76-108 (The Free Press 1991).
15. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 cmt. a (stating that the duty of good
faith forbids conduct that "violate[s] community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness"); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualiza-
tion, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982) (good faith "is of a piece with explicit requirements of
'contractual morality' such as the unconscionability doctrine and various general equitable prin-
ciples"). But see Market Street Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Despite its
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ture for the facilitation of private transactions. 17 So too, the rule of
law and the substance of property, contract, and tort law can be traced
back to moral reasoning. But as law emerged from felt instinct to align
itself with the learning of cognate disciplines, these rules are under-
stood today to be indispensable elements of a market economy. 18
It is not clear, though, that business ethics adds much to business
law, or that a business enterprise has any ethical responsibilities.
There is nothing surprising about this. Business law is well developed
in the United States and apart from the usual rules that concern com-
mercial transactions and the structure of the corporation, there are
extensive rules that govern the terms and condition of employment,
the protection of the environment and the protection of consumers. 19
Hence, the in-house codes of business ethics, now widely adopted for
reasons that may have little to do with business ethics,20 are simple
moralistic overtones, it is no more the injection of moral principles into contract law than the
fiduciary concept itself is.").
17. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) (2004) (stating that the purpose of the code is "to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions").
18. See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1637, 1694-95 (1998) ("Many moral principles have no backing from law ... On the other hand,
the law prohibits or attaches sanctions to a great deal of morally indifferent conduct").
19. See generally Adam Winkler, Case Studies in Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders:
Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of
History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2004) (discussing the protection of stakeholders
outside of the body of corporate law).
20. There are at least two sorts of business ethics codes. A listed company must disclose
whether it has adopted a code of ethics that applies to the company's principal executive officer,
principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller, or persons performing simi-
lar functions. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Release Nos. 33-8177 and 34-47235, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, and 240 (January 23, 2003). Compa-
nies traded on the NYSE must adopt a code of business conduct addressing conflicts of interest,
corporate opportunities, confidentiality, fair dealing, protection of company assets, compliance
with law and the reporting of illegal or unethical behavior. See FINAL NYSE CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE RULES ITEM 10; see NASD RULE 4350(n). The second code seeks to define the rela-
tion of the firm to the outside world. It includes a compliance program and an associated code
of conduct, designed to enable the firm to police itself and to count as a mitigating factor under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. Id. It restates the outlines of employment
law, antitrust law, environmental law, securities law, corrupt practices and economic espionage,
the main fields for which employee misdeeds may bring substantial civil or criminal liability
upon the firm, and has some sort of oversight and enforcement mechanism. See Note: The
Good, the Bad, and their Corporate Codes, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2126-27 (2003) (describing
forces driving the adoption of codes). Other causes include:
9 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which amended Section 13 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2002). Section (b)(2)(B) requires issuers to devise and maintain
a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable safeguards against the
unauthorized use or disposition of company assets and reasonable assurances that financial
records and accounts are sufficiently reliable for purposes of external reporting. Id.
* The oversight obligation of a board of directors.
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restatements of the law. 21 To the extent that these add anything to
pre-existing law, it is too vague to be actionable. 22 For example, GM,
which sells the Hummer, tells us that it believes in corporate responsi-
bility and in protecting the global environment and natural re-
[C]orporate boards may [not] satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed con-
cerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior man-
agement and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow man-
agement and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning
both the corporation's compliance with law and its business performance.
In re Caremark International Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
* The enforcement policies of governmental offices that reward self policing. See Report of
Investigation Prusuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission
Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Release No.
44969, October 23, 2001 (showing the policy of the SEC to consider the self policing efforts of an
accused in deciding whether to take enforcement action.).
* A desire to minimize the risk of punitive damages (we don't need to be punished), an
intention to conform one's actions to a generally accepted standard of practice and earn a pre-
sumption of being reasonable (e.g., conforming to industry standards being evidence of due care
in a design defect case), to fend off threatened government regulation (e.g., web site privacy
policies), and to glean whatever intangible public relations benefit one enjoys from appearing to
be virtuous.
21. The corporate ethics materials have grown complex; while the format varies, they typically
include a code of business conduct and another code that governs the conduct of executive of-
ficers. No matter what form the codes take, they are essentially a list of legal rules that govern
business conduct. See Dupont Code of Business Ethics (2002), available at http://wwwl.dupont.
com/dupontglobal/corp/documents/US/en-US/social/conductguide/pdf/Business-Ethics-Policy-
andProcedures.pdfhttp://wwwl .dupont.com/dupontglobal/corp/documents/US/enUS/social/
conductguide/pdf/BusinessEthicsPolicy andProcedures.pdf (prohibitions against conflicts of
interest and illicit payments figure prominently in the DuPont Business Ethics Policy); see also
Ethics at BellSouth (2005), available at http://www.ethics.bellsouth.com/aboutethicswhatsital-
labout.htmlhttp://www.ethics.bellsouth.com/aboutethicswhatsitallabout.html ( deals with em-
ployment law, competition law, conflicts of interest, insider trading and intellectual property,
among other topics); see also DuPont Business Conduct Guide (2002), available at http://
wwwl .dupont.com/dupontglobal/corp/documents/US/en US/social/conductguide/pdf/business-
conduct-eng.pdf (purporting to state DuPont's "ethical standards," but is essentially a restate-
ment of business law); see also,, Motorola's Ethics & Code of Business Conduct (2004), available
at http://www.motorola.com/content/0,,75-107,00.html.
22. See The Caux Round Table, Principles for Business (2003), available at http://www.
cauxroundtable.org/principles.html (discussing "moral values", and the need for businesses to be
"responsible citizens"). Various beliefs, values and responsibilities have been suggested for sam-
ple policies. Business for Social Responsibility, Business Principles (2005), available at http://
www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.cfm?DocumentID=48977#sample. A statement of
core values usually recites the firm's commitments to people - such as its customers, employees,
stakeholders or stockholders, and community, and to ideals - such as excellence and integrity.
See Seibel Core Values (2005), available at http://www.siebel.com/crm-company/core-values.
shtm; see also BellSouth Corporate Values (2005), available at http://www.ethics.bellsouth.com/
corporatevalues.html (reciting its devotion to communities, excellence and integrity); see also
Boeing Values (2005), available at http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/ethics/integst.
htm; see also Hewlett-Packard Business Ethics (2005), available at http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/
globalcitizenship/ethics/index (stating "enduring values" of honesty, excellence, responsibility,
etc.).
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sources. 23 In the "Responsibility Overview" on its website, Altria, the
parent company of the tobacco giant Philip Morris, pledges to follow
the law but it also undertakes a "responsibility effort" to its employ-
ees, the community, the environment, and to make not only lawful
business decisions but "responsible" ones as well.24 The same is true
of the ethics cases used in business schools. They tend to present ob-
vious legal issues, such as employment discrimination, environmental
protection, products safety, bribery, fraud (including deceptive adver-
tising and consumer fraud), misappropriation of trade secrets and cor-
porate opportunities, and insider trading.25 Most of the daily work of
in-house corporate ethics officers is to answer questions about con-
flicts of interest, an aspect of the duty of loyalty and a question of
law.
2 6
To some extent, then, what is called business ethics plainly overlaps
law. One may wonder why legal issues have been misnamed as ethical
issues, and why compliance with the law is not enough. After all, the
most recent round of corporate scandals involved violations of law
and have been prosecuted in courts of law. The scandals that are de-
scribed in the Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, July 16, 2002,27 including En-
ron, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications, Tyco International, and
Global Crossing, involved fraud, insider trading, and breaches of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Does the label matter? By using language imprecisely, and calling
law ethics, there is a chance that a business ethicist will be asked to
answer a question of law and do so incorrectly, or that a manager will
not understand he must act in such and such a way and that the choice
is not wholly his to make. (The risk of misunderstanding is com-
pounded by the business school curriculum. For a business school to
be accredited by the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business, its undergraduate curriculum must teach "ethical under-
standing", and on both the undergraduate and graduate levels "ethical
and legal responsibilities," but there is no explicit requirement that
23. Available at http://www.gm.com/company/gmability.
24. Available at http://www.altria.com/responsibility/04 00 ResponsibilityOver.asp.
25. See Ethics Teaching Materials for the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, available at http://ba.gsia.cmu.edu/ethics/teaching.htm; John Hooker, Why Business Eth-
ics?, (Apr. 2003), available at http://ba.gsia.cmu.edu/ethics/whybizethics.pdf.
26. What is an Ethics Officer?, available at http://www.eoa.org/Whatis.asp (includes managing
legal and regulatory compliance among an ethics officer's duties, which is concerning since this
person may not even be a lawyer). An ethics officer may also be "tasked with integrating their
organization's ethics and values initiatives." Id.
27. See Preliminary Report of American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsi-
bility, supra note 12.
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students study business law28 and many MBA programs do not re-
quire it).
There is also a danger of egocentrism, a belief that individuals are
free to pursue whatever each thinks is just in his own eyes and, to
paraphrase Roscoe Pound, that the individual conscience is the ulti-
mate arbiter of legal obligations.29 There is no standard conscience,
though. Absolute theories of morals passed with the Middle Ages.
This is why the positivists extracted law from ethics centuries ago.
Maybe people think that "ethics" means something more sublime
than law, but the freedom to do as one pleases can be exercised in any
direction. The emphasis on business ethics may unwittingly bring us
back to the relativism that the law has sought to remedy.
Most business ethics writing ignores existing law.30 One writer, for
example, regards the fiduciary duty of loyalty as a "metaphor," and is
concerned that his MBA students assume it to be true that as corpo-
rate managers, they should work to maximize shareholder wealth.31
Maybe this is because ethics writers tend to be moral philosophers and
not lawyers, or they distrust lawyers who too narrowly serve their cli-
ents' ends, or they find positivism distasteful because it separates law
from morality and can result in unprincipled action. Maybe they
mean to criticize the body of business law as immoral, or they find a
virtuous man to be better than one who is merely law abiding.32 Per-
haps ethics writers assume law to be declarative of moral ideals, an
28. The Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, Eligibility Procedures and
Accreditation Standards for Business Accreditation (2005), available at http://www.aacsb.edu/ac-
creditation/business/AACSBSTANDARDS-Jan05-Final.pdf.
29. Roscoe Pound, LAW AND MORALS 88 (Augustus M. Kelley 1969) (1926).
30. John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8
Bus. ETHICS Q., 19, 22 (1998) (stating, that a significant amount of the criticism that is directed
against the stockholder theory-that managers should maximize the financial returns of stock-
holders-results from overlooking constraints embodied in laws); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Reimagining
the Law, 9 Bus ETHICS Q. 603, 606 (1999) ( ("[b]ut viewing law as rules nonetheless positions it
as external to our moral lives in a significant sense"). The writer also notes "the paucity of
articles in business ethics examining the general relationship of law and ethics." Id. at 615.
31. Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1416 (1993).
32. One academic has stated:
What it is to fall into a vice cannot be adequately specified independently of circum-
stances: the very same action which would in one situation be liberality could in an-
other be prodigality and in a third meanness. Hence judgement has an indispensable
role in the life of the virtuous man which it does not and could not have in, for example,
the life of the merely law-abiding or rule-abiding man.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation
Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American Society and
Anthony T. Kronman's, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 707, 714 (1996) (quoting Alasdair Maclntyre, AFTER VIRTUE 154 (2d ed. 1984)).
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ancillary structure which may be disregarded in favor of the primary
foundation, and an aspect of what is wrong with the current order.
Maybe they do not mean to describe the existing state of affairs, ex-
cept to criticize the distributional inequities of a system based upon
profit and efficiency.
Instead, ethics writers ask how the world might be made a better,
fairer, more just place. They purport to write on a blank slate and
invent the world of business anew, to serve society at large, in accor-
dance with principles of normative ethical theory and ideals of justice
and social welfare.33 Is the purpose of business ethics to construct an
ideal world that values altruism and move us towards it, or is it to give
useful advice to managers? If the latter, then one must appreciate
that the manager operates in a world with existing legal responsibili-
ties. The point has been made before,34 but it remains questionable
whether it has been answered.
A practicing lawyer may have a different view, not meaning to offer
an ideal alternative to the existing reality but rather to describe the
world as it is. A lawyer may also assume that law has a pragmatic
function, and that it does not exist simply because there are moral
arguments against deceit and in favor of honoring one's promises.
Business law exists in order that markets may operate and that busi-
ness may be done. 35 Vague and confusing as lay people sometimes
find law to be, it is reasonably well worked out.36 It gives guidance:
deals are structured and closed, clients counseled, cases decided. If
there are problems with the existing order, it may be that the solutions
lie not in an imaginative recreation of an ideal world, but more simply,
in a dedication to the enforcement of existing law.
One might point to the connection between law and morals and to
the open-ended nature of legal reasoning (the occasional use of fuzzy
standards instead of bright-line rules, the possibility of there being
good legal arguments in support of both sides of a case) as justifica-
33. See Ronald Duska, Business Ethics: Oxymoron or Good Business, 10 Bus. ETHICS Q. 111
(2000).
34. Andrew Stark, "What's the Matter with Business Ethics", Harvard Business Review, v. 71
(May/June 1993) 38.
35. See F.A. Hayek, T-i ROAD TO SERFDOM 43 (1994 ed.); see generally Richard A Epstein,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
36. Philosophy may be able to tell us that an individual should have a right to privacy, but it is
preposterous to imagine that philosophy can tell us whether there should be a right to privacy in
a public telephone booth or in a department store dressing room. Charles Fried, The Artificial
Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 54-57 (1981). It is the peculiar
task of law to complete this structure of ideals and values, to bring it down to earth; to complete
it so that it is seated firmly and concretely and shelters real human beings against the storms of
passion and conflict." Id.
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tion for paying less attention to law and more to moral philosophy.
That would be a mistake. Whatever view one takes of the nature of
law and its relation to morality, and how it is that judges do or should
decide cases, all lawyers share a concept of law. They may disagree
about the nature of law but a specialized legal profession exists. Law-
yers do something that "not just anyone can do."' 37 Legal rules enjoy
a kind of autonomy from morality as such. We deliberately render
these rules susceptible to technical application and analysis ... And
to facilitate this application and analysis we bring into being a legal
profession, from which we draw our judges, that is composed of
people trained in programs of study that teach not, or not just,
moral philosophy, but the specific tools and techniques of research,
interpretation, reasoning and argument relevant to legal analysis. 38
A lawyer could, of course, use moral reasoning in advising a client not
only about what means and techniques to use but about what ends to
achieve. That might be part of what it means to be a wise counselor,
but it goes beyond a technical understanding of the law.3 9
It is a mistake to confuse legal problems with ethical ones because
one's personal moral views are irrelevant in a courtroom.
III. THE NEED FOR EFFICIENCY IN A
COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE
Since law does not fully determine business action, rarely compel-
ling a specific mission or means, the criticism may amount to very lit-
tle beyond an insistence on using language precisely. Perhaps there is
a domain for business ethics, as long as its writers are careful to avoid
the complementary perils of vagueness and redundancy with existing
law. Is there any compelling reason why business should not be ex-
pected to somehow be "better" than the minimum required by law?
Set aside for the moment the genuine difficulty of defining what "bet-
ter" means, and assume that there are universal ethical norms which
are not embodied in law. The law sets a minimum wage, which is not
a livable wage. Why should a firm not do better and pay more? It can
pay more to attract better workers, to keep turnover low, to attract a
socially conscious consumer who will pay higher prices for its output,
but if the firm pays more without corresponding benefit to itself, it has
placed itself at a competitive disadvantage and, therefore, this is un-
likely to happen. Since a business must survive in the competitive
37. Avery Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2229,
2251 (1996).
38. Robert P George, What is Law? A Century of Arguments, 112 FIRST THINGS 23 (April
2001), available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ftOlO4/articles/george.html.
39. Katz, supra note 37, at 2261-62.
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marketplace, it cannot afford to be better to the point of sacrificing
profit and gain without commensurate payoff.
Repugnant though some find this to be, it is the existing reality. A
business is governed primarily not by law but by the requirements of
the marketplace - by the need to be efficient, to satisfy customers,
employees, and the like. A business exists to make profit for its own-
ers; it must respond efficiently to the demands and opportunities of
the marketplace. Shareholder wealth maximization may be contro-
versial, reviled by some ethical theorists who prefer a social model
that emphasizes some sort of community responsibility, but it reflects
the basic commercial understanding, at least in the U.S. A board's
main goal is corporate profits. 40
Profit is an obvious motivator, and it also allows the price mecha-
nism to function. This is textbook economics about how markets
work. Price competition among suppliers and consumers, who seek to
maximize their own profit, allows the system to find a price that will
match supply to demand. Competition thus allows for an efficient al-
location of resources, minimizes waste and allows a complex economy
to be organized. The system creates wealth. But, one might ask:
wealth for what purpose? Efficiency and profit are not ends in them-
selves. Some grow rich while others stay poor. One might believe
that self-interest and the profit motive are bad, that altruism is good,
that less should go to owners and more to workers and the commu-
nity, that mangers should be nicer to stakeholders. 41 The current real-
ity, though, is that business leaders are almost exclusively bottom line
oriented, and stakeholder theory (that managers should manage the
business for the benefit of all stakeholders) is not the current state of
the law.
40. A.A. Sommer, Jr., It All Comes Down to Money, ABA GENERAL PRACTICE, SOLO &
SMALL FIRM SECTION MAGAZINE ( September 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/gen-
practice/magazinelbestofsept99/sommer.html "[A] corporation ... should have as its objective
the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a)
(1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
41. See e.g., Allen, supra note 13, at 1402 (discussing the "social or realist perspective"); see
also David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians and the
Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1374-75 (1993) (noting that managerial
pursuit of shareholder wealth may result in laid-off workers, and that efficiency may be at odds
with individual dignity and social welfare); see also Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corpo-
rate Law, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1718 (1993) (noting the "antipathy" and "revulsion"
that some feel towards the shareholder primacy norm); see Benedict Sheehy, The Importance of
Corporate Models: Economic and Jurisprudential Values and the Future of Corporate Law, 2
DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L. J. 463 (2004) (noting that economic efficiency and shareholder pri-
macy devalue people and create distributional inequities, hence non-shareholders must have ac-
cess to corporate power).
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Perhaps the current model of economic organization is not optimal,
but who is wise enough to say? It should merely be pointed out that
many of those who write about business ethics are also teachers in
business schools and law schools. These are, to an extent, vocational
schools. Students often come to these professors to be trained as busi-
ness managers and business lawyers. If the professional schools mean
to teach their students the skills they need to find good employment
within the existing system, then the faculty should acquaint its stu-
dents with useful knowledge. If one means instead to condemn the
existing system as unjust, then the faculty should clearly label its com-
ment as editorial.
There is another point about the requirements of the marketplace.
The market itself can serve as a policeman and compel a firm to be-
have in accordance with prevailing social norms. For example, the law
would allow a business to hire only short people; can this be morally
acceptable? The hypothetical is absurd, though, because any business
so foolish as hire on some basis other than talent will not long endure.
The need to be efficient in a competitive marketplace, and to succeed
in the long run, explains much business action that we would like to
call ethical, and further reduces the need for a manager to understand
moral theory.
There are costs for misbehaving, apart from legal sanctions. The
marketplace sometimes punishes bad acts. Selling shoddy goods
drives customers away; bad workplace conditions drives employees
away; wasteful use of resources drives costs up. In the long run, these
practices tend to fail. This is particularly true when there will be re-
peated transactions and enduring relationships, because the gain from
future cooperation exceeds the immediate gain that cheating might
bring. Hence, the importance of one's reputation and the special so-
licitude that the law gives for one defamed in his trade or profession.
It is not that good ethics is good business. It is the other way around.
Good business practices happen to be fair and square. Maybe this is
why the law regards compliance with trade custom as evidence not
only of due care, but of good faith as well. 42
Generally, "socially responsible deliberation will not lead manage-
ment to decisions different from those indicated by long run profit
considerations. 43 When Johnson & Johnson promptly withdrew Tyle-
nol after the first evidence of tampering appeared, that was an ethical
42. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v Behmer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) ("What usually is done
may be evidence of what ought to be done..."); U.C.C. § 2-103(1)0) (good faith means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade).
43. Stark, supra note 34, at 39 (quoting Wilbur Katz).
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thing to do, but it also made good business sense and probably pleased
the general counsel.44 A paper products company replants trees.
That is good for the environment, but it is also good for the long term
health of the company.45 Best HR practices may require more than
minimal legal compliance in order to attract the best talent, for exam-
ple by offering better benefits and by hiring from a broader pool than
the law may require, but this makes competitive sense. A firm that
takes a long term view of profits will try to preserve good relations
with those with whom it deals. 46 This is a matter of strategy, not
ethics.
Does it matter whether this sort of thinking is called business judg-
ment instead of ethical analysis? Consider the following example. In
April 2005, Pfizer voluntarily reformulated Sudafed, so that it no
longer contained pseudophedrine, a key ingredient that can be used
by illegal labs to make methamphetamine. Congress and various state
legislatures were considering bills to require the reformulation, but
none had been enacted into law.4 7 It is unclear whether Pfizer acted
for ethical reasons, in consideration of the well-being of the commu-
nity, or was simply responding to the likelihood that the change would
soon be forced by law, or hoped to preempt legislation by acting
voluntarily.
There is a difference between action motivated by ethical concerns
and action designed to respond to the ethical demands of the market-
place. A response to the marketplace simply requires that managers
be cognizant of the conditions of the marketplace and consider the
"generally accepted moral conventions current at the time". 48 They
44. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comment on Dunfee, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160 (1999).
45. E.g., The Sustainable Forestry Initiative of the American Forest and Paper Association
(2002), available at http://www.afandpa.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Environment-and-Re-
cycling/SFI/SFI.htm. The program is advertised as being a "smart investment." Wall St. J., Apr.
22, 2005, at A8.
46. Carr, supra note 5, at 149.
47. Heather Won Tesoriero, Pfizer Reversal on Curbing Cold Pills May Help company, WALL
ST. J., April 13, 2005, at B1.
48. Repouille v United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir 1947) (quoting United States v.
Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947) In Repouille, Judge Learned Hand was required to decide
whether a man who had euthanized his son under tragic circumstances was of "good moral char-
acter" as required by the Nationality Act. Id. Hand's biographer wrote:
Applying the "good moral character" requirement presented special difficulties for a
judge like Hand. His was a modest rather than activist view of judging, and he consid-
ered it beyond a judge's duty and competence to impose his own moral standards upon
the community. Moreover, he was of course a skeptic, doubtful of any absolute moral
standards. Yet Congress had commanded the judges to give content to the vague
phrase "good moral character" ... His resort to the "common conscience" formula
was an effort to escape judicial subjectivism by relying on some outside source.
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need not conform to it and are free to assign it whatever weight they
consider appropriate in the exercise of their business judgment. An
ethical decision, in contrast, would require that managers undertake
their own original ethical analysis and then follow it even if it ad-
versely affects long term shareholder value. (What is the point, other-
wise?) The former requires managers to think primarily about the
well-being of their enterprise, the latter about the well-being of third
party stakeholders. A manager who is exercising business judgment
will be concerned to know if the proposed action will result in a net
gain. If there is none, then the action is not likely to be taken. If
there is gain to be gotten from pleasing customers, motivating employ-
ees or fending off regulators, there is no need to justify the action
further in the language of ethical analysis.
In an article that appeared in 2000, an ethics scholar wrote that it is
not sufficient for managers to tell the truth and keep their promises
because doing so happens to be good business. The professor worried
that managers will not do so when being ethical is no longer good for
business.49 (Set aside the probable liability for breach of contract or
fraud; the professor did not consider the law.) How often does it
happen that lawful action, undertaken for the long term well-being of
the business, will violate the prevailing ethical mindset? If there are
not likely to be many cases in which it is good for long run profit to be
sleazy, then perhaps the current emphasis on business ethics is
misdirected.
The flaw is not with the economic motive that drives a business, but
rather with the short term perspective that some managers take. The
pressures for short term gain are "broad and systemic. ' '50 Maybe the
pressure to meet Wall Street's expectations every quarter, and to sat-
isfy not just a small group of seasoned institutional investors but the
whole investing public, drives a short term agenda. Maybe stock in-
centive compensation encourages short term manipulations to drive
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 629-30 (1994). Perhaps this is
what Milton Friedman meant when he wrote of "ethical custom:"
[A] corporate executive.., has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibil-
ity is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society,
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM 17; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 133-36 (1962) (presenting similar views).
49. Duska, supra note 33, at 120; see also Hooker, supra note 25, at 1-2 ("Ethics exists pre-
cisely because ethical conduct does not always pay.").
50. William H Simon, What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Pub-
lic Responsibilities?, 50 WASH & LEE L. REv. 1697, 1701 (1993).
[Vol. 4:55
Is BUSINESS ETHICS NECESSARY?
up share prices.51 Perhaps the likelihood that one will have a series of
jobs and careers in different fields diminishes the importance of repu-
tation at any single place and time. Addressing this structural prob-
lem so that managers of large publicly traded companies (the ethics
movement hardly seems driven by the behavior of local merchants,
not even the used car dealer) can afford to take a long-term perspec-
tive to their relationships with investors, employees, customers, and
the like, instead of seeking gain in one-shot schemes, would be better
than preaching morality to our students, since people are more likely
to respond to incentives than exhortations to be virtuous.5 2
Reconsider the long term manager. Common sense dictates that
there are cases in which a well run, profitable business follows the law,
but the outcome seems bad and the law insufficient. Examples come
easily to mind, though of course value judgments are often quirky:
tobacco products, assault weapons, wasteful SUVs, polluters in places
or at times of inadequate environmental law, employers who pay a
lawful but inadequate minimum wage (the standard example of this
being a Third World sweat shop), purveyors of violent or vulgar pop
culture, sellers of unwholesome fast foods or useless nutritional sup-
plements, etcetera.5 3 One faculty colleague suggests that Wal-Mart
should stay out of bucolic Vermont.
Markets sometimes fail. Ignorance can cause this. Consumers may
lack information. There may be inadequate competition. Employees
may not be able to find another job so easily. There may be high
switching costs, or a lack of bargaining power. There may be negative
externalities and costs passed along to outsiders. The marketplace is
not a perfect cop. When it fails, there may be a role for regulation by
law. What if the law is inadequate, though? The law is not a perfect
institution. Wrongdoers sometimes evade responsibility through gaps
in the structure or enforcement of the law. Should a firm not consider
the well-being of the environment and the community and refrain
from discharging harmful pollution even if permitted by law? Should
it not pay more than the prevailing minimum wage, even if it can at-
51. See JOSEPH STIGLITz, THE ROARING NINETIES 120-21 W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
2003) (stock options did not provide incentives to increase the long term value of the firm).
52. See Winkler, supra note 19, at 126 (discussing some suggested solutions to the short term
mentality).
53. An obvious addition would be the field of medical research. Bioethics is a necessary topic
of inquiry, even if business ethics is of doubtful value. Medicine has traditionally been under-
stood to be a profession, motivated not by the profit motive but by a concern for the well being
of the patient. The problems related to advances in biomedical science and technology are so
closely bound up with life and death, and a concern about playing God, that they are not compa-
rable to ordinary business problems.
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tract a sufficient labor force by paying only the legal minimum? Simi-
larly, should a firm not refrain from advocating its own selfish cause,
and not lobby against proposed legislation that would force it to bear
the cost of an externality?
Assume the strongest possible case for business ethics: a product
that is expensive and harmful, laws that are grossly inadequate, and a
consumer who is poor, ignorant and illiterate. Assume, too, that the
market is far away so that the chances of negative publicity and angry
boycotts back home are small. This is similar to what happened in the
Nestle infant formula case. Nestle sold its breast milk substitute in
Africa to women who could not read well enough to follow instruc-
tions and prepare the formula properly, who lacked access to clean
water and sufficient fuel to sterilize the equipment, and who could not
afford to buy enough of the formula to prepare it full strength. The
babies were fed diluted formula made with dirty water.5 4 If there is a
case to be made for business ethics, this must be it. It is too cold-
blooded to pursue lawful profits at such appalling cost, and yet one
must be careful not to allow such exceptional cases to serve as a basis
for a general discipline. Even if special rules ought to apply to mul-
tinational activity in failed nations, this does not make a case for the
widespread teaching and adoption of business ethics in the developed
world.
Ethical thinking might come into play if one were considering to
forego a profitable and legal opportunity (for example, marketing,
without false advertising, a useless but harmless product), or to incur
voluntarily a cost that one might legally avoid (for example, some sort
of environmental remediation in excess of regulatory standards),
where doing so brings no offsetting payoff. It seems unlikely that this
would happen since altruism is not the dominant motivator of people
in market transactions. But even if it is assumed that a firm will place
itself at competitive disadvantage out of a sense of duty to the greater
good, this clearer focus still does not make the case for business ethics.
Even if there are problems not fully solved by law and basic business
judgment, by what method will the business ethicists deal with them?
One does not have to be a trained philosopher to understand that
mistreating someone today will diminish the chances of earning their
custom and goodwill. To add to the stock of human understanding,
business ethics should teach something other than basic business judg-
ment. It should teach something other than law. To be really useful,
54. See, e.g., Naomi Bromberg Bar-Yam, The Nestle boycott: the story of the WHO/UNICEF
Code for Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes, MOTHERING, Winter 1995, available at http://www.
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m0838/isn77/ai_17623557.
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business ethics should also teach something other than moral theory,
since knowing what is moral has little or nothing to do with wanting to
do a moral act.55 (At least the burden should be on the proponents of
academic moral theory to prove that their discipline actually matters
to the conduct of business.) As well, a proponent of business ethics
should explain why it is better for a single firm to put itself at competi-
tive disadvantage than it is for the legislature to revise the law so that
all firms are similarly burdened. Finally, a proponent of business eth-
ics should explain why it is the job of business to be considerate of my
well-being or my tastes, beyond the concern of any prudent business
not to alienate those whose good will it requires. Why should the
managers of Wal-Mart decline a profitable opportunity to enter upon
the pristine soil of Vermont if the legislative bodies of that state have
not seen fit to enact exclusionary rules?
IV. THE MANAGER'S DUTY OF LOYALTY
The preceding arguments apply equally to all forms of business en-
terprise, from a sole proprietorship to a public corporation. Law and
enlightened self-interest will resolve most questions of business ethics
in a way that most people will find appealing, without the need to
resort to questions of social responsibility. If the business is a corpora-
tion and there is not a strict identity between its owners and managers,
then there will be still another reason why the managers should not be
motivated by public service concerns. To curtail the possibility of self-
dealing, the law requires that they be accountable to the stockholders
of the corporation.
Is a corporate manager ever ethically obligated to act in ways that
do not promote the fundamental purpose of the business? If there are
no such cases, then ethical analysis has no practical application. If
there are such cases, though, then ethical analysis may require a man-
ager to breach his legal duty to his employer. Does the law permit a
manager to make an "ethical" decision when doing so diminishes gain
and profit, and when the contrary action would be lawful and profita-
ble and within the scope of a corporate opportunity? This is the rele-
vant question, narrowly framed.
The state of the law is not entirely clear. While the American Law
Institute acknowledges that the case law was not "entirely harmoni-
ous," 56 its effort at clarification of a manager's ability to take into ac-
55. "Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will." Rachel Cohon, Hume's Moral Philosophy,
STAN. ENCY. OF PHIL. (2004), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moralU.
56. PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, § 2.01 cmt. a.
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count ethical considerations 57 has not been cited by a single court in
the 13 years since it was published. The scholarly commentary is ex-
tensive, probably vaster than need be and certainly vaster than need
be cited here. The debate is between the communitarians, who favor
a "multi-fiduciary" model, and the contractarians, who favor the
shareholder primacy norm, and it has gone on "ad nauseum. ' 58 All of
the law review articles have one thing in common, though. They all
cite the same small body of case law. The "shareholder primacy
norm" - that a corporation is to be run primarily for the profit of the
shareholders - appears to be the accepted rule.5 9 The board and of-
ficers are supposed to run the business with the objective of maximiz-
ing corporate wealth and shareholder profit.60 "It is the obligation of
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run inter-
ests of the corporation's stockholders; that they may sometimes do so
'at the expense' of others ... does not for that reason constitute a
breach of duty. ' 61 They may take a long term view of this, however,
and need not squeeze every penny out of every opportunity. (A spe-
cific example of this is the ability of a board to say no to an offer to
buy the company for more than its current value, if they believe their
own strategy will generate even greater value in the future.62) They
may spend a bit today to earn a bit more tomorrow. They may even
donate money to charity and philanthropy.63 They may not however
waste the assets of the business, though it is a difficult burden to prove
waste. 64 Whatever the prevailing standard may be, a court will hardly
ever second guess the substance of management's decisions, as long as
57. Id. § 2.01(b).
58. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cogni-
tive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 651, 686 (2004).
59. Sommer, supra note 40; Stephen H. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423-35 (1993);
Allen, supra note 13, at 1406; William H. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case for Constituency
Rights, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1462-65 (1993); Licht, supra note 58, at 688; Winkler,
supra note 19, at 110.
60. The classic case, cited by every writer, is Dodge v Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459 (1919).
E.g PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, § 2.01 Reporter's Note.
61. Katz v Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
62. The "Just Say No" principle that is available to a board when it is in the Unocal mode or
when it has agreed to a merger of equals. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
63. The standard case cited here by every writer is A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v Barlow, 13 N.J. 145
(1953). E.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, § 2.01 Reporter's Note 2. It is no secret that "corporate
executives too often take liberties with corporate money and, in the name of charity, bestow
benefits upon themselves." Winkler, supra note 19, at 118. Money given to the symphony re-
sults in front row tickets, etc. Id.
64. MJ Pritchett III, Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Critique of the ALI State-
ment on Corporate Governance Section 2.01(B), 71 CALIF. L. REV. 994, 997-998 (1983).
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the decision was made by an informed, disinterested and independent
body, which is to say that the business judgment rule in effect gives
management fairly broad discretion in running the business.65
Beyond this, a board may consider the interests of employees and
the community when determining its response to a hostile takeover.
Delaware case law allows this and many states have statutes that allow
it, but no law (except Connecticut) mandates that stakeholder inter-
ests be considered, and in no state may the statutes be enforced by
stakeholder plaintiffs. The American Bar Association concluded that
the constituency statutes added little to existing law, in part because
only shareholders may vote in the election of corporate directors.66
Stockholders can also bring a derivative suit; stakeholders cannot.
The consensus is that the effect of these laws has been to benefit man-
agement, by confirming or expanding their discretion in making deci-
sions, and their resulting ability to keep control. 67
The ALI Principles build upon this foundation. They state that the
chief objective of the business corporation is "the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain. '' 68 This "economic objective," which is a "basic proposition, ' 69 is
qualified by the three subparts of § 2.01(b) of the ALI Principles. The
first qualification is that the corporation, in the pursuit of its economic
objective, must follow the law, even if doing so means that corporate
profit and shareholder gain are not enhanced.70 This is unexceptional.
Skipping for a moment, the third qualification recognizes the practice
of donating money for philanthropic purposes, which may be of ques-
tionable direct benefit to the corporation but if it is an abuse, it is a
long standing abuse to give corporate funds to one's alma mater or to
the symphony.71 The second qualification, like the third one and un-
65. The universally cited case is Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill.App.2d 173 (1st Dist. 1968). E.g.,
Principles, supra note 40, § 2.01 Reporter's Note 2.
66. Preliminary Report oftthe American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibil-
ity, supra note 12. See also Bratton, supra note 58, at 1468 ("unlikely to see an expansive inter-
pretation" of the constituency statutes);Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of
Corporate Law, 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1598 (1993) ("the statutes only reaffirm tradi-
tional prerogatives of managerial discretion").
67. Winkler, supra note 19, at 124; Gary von Strange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through
Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 489 (1994); Kathleen Hale,
Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 823,
834-838 (2003); Licht, supra note 58, at 703 (the constituency statutes "have received only cur-
sory attention from the courts and have played a negligible part, if any, in litigation involving
directors' decisions.").
68. PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, § 2.01(a).
69. Id. § 2.01 cmt. e.
70. Id. § 2.01(b)(1).
71. Id. § 2.01(b)(3).
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like the first, is permissive and not mandatory.72 It states that the cor-
poration "[m]ay take into account ethical considerations that are
reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of busi-
ness" even if profit and gain are not enhanced. 73 What does this
mean?74 The reporter noted that "(t)here is very little direct authority
on the permissibility of taking ethical considerations into account in
framing corporate action when doing so might not enhance profits. ' 75.
The very little authority turns out to be none at all. The cited cases
concern voluntary payments made to retiring executives for past ser-
vices, or to their widows.76 This is probably not the sort of thing that
current business ethicists have in mind. The comments, illustrations,
and reporters' notes shed some light. We are told that "such conduct
will usually be consistent with economic self-interest. '77 This is be-
cause treating fairly "employees, customers, suppliers and members of
the community in which the corporation operates" will probably con-
tribute to long term profit and shareholder gain.78 Apart from this, a
decision which is protected by the business judgment rule will also
satisfy § 2.01.79
There are illustrations of hypothetical cases in which an "ethical"
approach does not involve a departure from the basic economic objec-
tive. For example, a corporation enters into a contract that is unen-
forceable under the Statute of Frauds. Performance will result in a
small loss, about two percent of annual earnings, but the management
decides to honor its verbal agreement because doing so will bolster
market confidence in the corporation's willingness to honor its com-
mitments and likely lead to greater long term gains.80 Other illustra-
tions include cases in which employee morale is boosted or
unfavorable regulation or public reaction is forestalled. 81
Comment h of the Principles of Corporate Governance states that
"(i)t is sometimes argued that because adherence to ethical principles
typically involves long-run financial benefits, the concept of the long
72. Id. § 2.01 (b)(2).
73. Id. § 2.01 (b)(3).
74. The provision was criticized in draft form a decade before its adoption and at the time of
its adoption, as being unnecessary since existing law allowed corporate officials sufficient lati-
tude and conversely, because the provision was an unwarranted deviation from existing law.
Pritchett, supra note 63, at 1010; Bainbridge, supra note 58, at n. 4.
75. PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, § 2.01 Reporter's Note 5.
76. See id.
77. Id. § 2.01 cmt. f.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. Ill. 1.
81. PRINCIPLES, supra note 40,Ills. 2-5.
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run dissolves any apparent tension between financial and ethical con-
siderations. '82 This brings to mind the question asked in section III of
this paper. When, if ever, do these considerations diverge? One ex-
ample is given. Reconsider the oral contract case, but change one
fact. Assume that the corporation is going out of business and that it
will be dissolved. There is no long term gain to be gotten from per-
forming the contract. What should management do? The given an-
swer is, they may do whatever they like, as long as they have made a
considered decision within the scope of the business judgment rule.8 3
Management may, if it wishes, think about ethical considerations, or
not, in the exercise of its business judgment. 84 Apart from the dissolv-
ing firm, in which ethics may or may not matter, ethics and long term
profitability appear not to be in tension. This view is reinforced by
Illustration 19: A publicly held corporation with assets of $100 million
and annual earnings of $13 to $15 million owns three profitable alumi-
num plants and one plastics plant that loses $4 million a year.85 The
plastics plant has no prospect of becoming profitable.8 6 The firm de-
cides to sell it but the only interested buyer intends to convert the
plant to a new use and lay off many of the workers. 87 Do ethical con-
siderations justify the firm refusing to sell and continuing to operate
the plastics plant in order to save jobs?
It cannot be justified under § 2.01(b)(2)[the ethical exception to the
general rule], because a corporation is not ethically obliged to con-
tinue indefinitely the operation of a business that is losing large
amounts of money, equal to more than one fourth of the corpora-
tion's earnings, for the purpose of keeping workers employed. The
action cannot be justified under § 2.01(a) [the economic objective
general rule], because the action is not motivated by profit consider-
ations, and on the facts it would not be within the realm of business
judgment to conclude that the action will result in short- or long-
term profits exceeding the costs involved. 88
A manager's ability to take into account ethical considerations is
further discussed, if not clarified, by other language in comment h. It
states that "a manufacturer of consumer goods may owe an ethical
obligation to produce safe goods" and that "the content of the fairness
obligation owed to groups such as employees may depend in part on
past statements and practices that have engendered reasonable reli-
82. Id. § 2.01 cmt. h.
83. Id. Ills. 11-12.
84. Id. § 2.01 cmt. h.
85. Id. Il. 19.
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ance or legitimate expectations. '"8 9 But the duty of a manufacturer to
produce safe products is the concern of products liability law, as well
as various other regulatory schemes, and is also affected by market
driven self regulation such as Underwriters Laboratories. So too, past
statements or practices that engender reliance or create expectations
is the concern of employment law (the implied in fact contract) and
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The ALI gives no indication how
ethical conduct in these cases differs from simple legal compliance.
(This is the same sort of confusion noted in section II of this paper.)
Nor, in general, does § 2.01 explain how ethical considerations add to
basic business judgment exercised with a view towards long term
profitability.
Current law embodies the shareholder wealth norm but we may still
ask whether the law makes sense. The duty of loyalty runs to the cor-
poration and its stockholders because of a concern that managers who
are not subject to a clear duty will manipulate corporate property for
their own personal benefit. Professor Berle expressed the point this
way:
[W]hen the fiduciary obligation of the corporate management and
'control' to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the manage-
ment and 'control' become for all practical purposes absolute. The
claims upon the assembled industrial wealth and funneled industrial
income which managements are then likely to enforce (they have no
need to urge) are their own.90
Were it otherwise, and managers required to maximize the interests
of multiple stakeholders, then whose interests should management
pursue when shareholder and other interests conflict? One cannot
serve two masters. "Freed of both and answerable to neither," agency
costs rise and wealth falls.91 This does not mean that management
may deal at will with customers, creditors, employees, and other
stakeholders since these relationships are governed by contract and
regulation, but managers must still "work for the best interests of the
stockholders" 92 and seek to maximize profit for their benefit. While a
manager may consider the effects of business action upon the market,
the environment, the community, and public opinion in deciding what
is best for the corporation and its owners, their interest must be deter-
minative because a manager cannot simultaneously maximize the val-
89. Id.
90. Berle, supra note 4, at 1367.
91. Licht, supra note 58, at 706 (quoting FRANK H EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991); see also Bainbridge, supra note 59, at
1435; see also Bratton, supra note 58, at 1451.
92. Dodd, supra note 4, at 1153.
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ues of several independent variables. Stockholders cannot receive the
greatest returns if workers (and managers!) receive super premium
salaries, if the community receives munificent charity, if output is sold
to consumers at cost. Ends collide; one cannot have it all. Hard
choices must be made. "The need to choose, to sacrifice some ulti-
mate values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of
the human predicament. ' 93 If he has several first objectives, the man-
ager has no true objective and no principled basis upon which to make
his choices.94 If he serves several constituencies, the manager can pur-
sue his own interests by playing off one against the other.95
Management can say to stockholders that the business lost money
because management had to take employees' interests into account,
and then management can turn around and tell employees that their
pay will not go up because the stockholders will not allow it - when in
fact the reason for both is that management has done a terrible job
running the company, but they would rather not admit that and get
fired, and so the stakeholder concept can have the practical effect of
sanctioning managerial irresponsibility.96 There are no clear measures
for qualifying as a responsible executive, if gain and profit are not the
standard. 97
V. "FELT MORAL OBLIGATIONS"
Professor Ronald Green has asked to move beyond the "metaphor"
of manager as fiduciary because if managers are not permitted to fol-
93. ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 43 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2002) (1969).
Surely if we have learned anything from the history of morals it is that the thing to do
with a moral quandary is not to hide it. Like nettles, the occasions when life forces us to
choose between the lesser of two evils must be grasped with the consciousness that they
are what they are. The vice of this use of the principle that, at certain limiting points,
what is utterly immoral cannot be law or lawful is that it will serve to cloak the true
nature of the problems with which we are faced and will encourage the romantic opti-
mism that all the values we cherish ultimately will fit into a single system, that no one of
them has to be sacrificed or compromised to accommodate another .... This is surely
untrue and there is an insincerity in any formulation of our problem which allows us to
describe the treatment of the dilemma as if it were the disposition of the ordinary
case."
Katz, supra note 37, at 2268-69 (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 619-20 (1958).
94. Licht, supra note 58, at 726 (citing Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN. MGMNT. 297, 300-01 (2001).
95. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1438.
96. Licht, supra note 58, at 707 (citing Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43
U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303 (1993) (taking interests of all constituencies into account allows man-
agement to justify almost any action on the grounds that it benefits some group)).
97. Sommer, supra note 40; Pritchett, supra note 64, at 1007; Allen, supra note 13, at 1406.
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low their "felt moral obligations," then disasters like the deaths at
Bhopal, the Dalkon Shield infections, and Johns-Manville asbestos
poisoning will continue to happen. 98 In all cases, protracted, massive
litigation ensued and there was profoundly negative publicity. No ra-
tional manager would choose a course of action that would lead to
this, even if in the end the damages awarded against the corporations
were less than the plaintiffs had sought.99 These cases suggest a need
for managers to be better skilled in the rudimentary calculations of
ordinary business judgment and to understand the probability, costs
and risks of litigation, more than they suggest a need for training in
moral theory.
Imagine instead that the misconduct had been less extreme, and
that the firm was not inflicting serious harm upon others but that the
moral sense of the employee happened to be out of sync with the em-
ployer's business. An employee is not supposed to pursue his idiosyn-
cratic sense of morality on the job. According to the ALI Principles,
ethical considerations are admissible only "as appropriate to the re-
sponsible conduct of business." 100  This is part of what it means to
work for another. "Chaos would result" if a single employee were
able to determine, according to the dictates of his or her individual
conscience, whether the work of the firm should continue, assuming
that the firm is conducting its business wholly within the law.101
98. Green, supra note 31, at 1419. The Dalkon Shield may not be the best example of unethi-
cal misconduct. The evidence of design defect is unclear. Ten women who used the Shield died
from miscarriage related infections, although some 2.8 million women had used the device.
IUDs: Still Worth Considering (2004), available at http://www.pdrhealth.com/content/women-
health/chapters/fgwh20.shtml. A 1992 study concluded that the Shield was "safe and effective
when inserted by a skilled and experienced clinician." Mumford S.D. and Kessel E., Was the
Dalkon Shield a safe and effective intrauterine device? The conflict between case-control and
clinical trial study findings(1992), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?
cmd=retrieve&db=PubMed&list uids= 1601137&dopt=Abstract.
99. Following unsuccessful efforts to sue Union carbide in the US, ensuing litigation in India
eventually produced a settlement agreement, which gained the final approval of the Supreme
Court of India in 1991. Bano v Union Carbide, 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001); affd in part, vacated
in part,, 361 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2004); see In re A.H. Robins Co., 89 B.R. 555 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988) (disallowing punitive damages claim where allowance would frustrate successful reorgani-
zation); see In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding "inequitable
on its face" recovery of punitive damages which would deplete trust assets to benefit some credi-
tors at expense of others), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd sub nom.
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
100. PRINCIPLES, supra note 40, § 2.01(b)(2).
101. Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1980).
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VI. APPLYING STANDARD ETHICAL ANALYSES: THE SALE OF
INTERNET CENSORING SOFTWARE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
The usual ethics cases may be behind the times, conceived when the
law gave less protection to workers, consumers and the environment,
so maybe it is unfair to criticize them as being redundant with existing
law. Consider instead the current case of the U.S. technology firms
such as Microsoft, Yahoo, and Cisco Systems, reported to be helping
foreign governments censor the content of the Internet. Does ethical
analysis illuminate the issues more clearly than law and long term
profit considerations do?
The firms apparently sell off the shelf equipment that can be used to
filter content, and may also design custom made equipment for that
purpose, though the news reports are unclear. China, Iran and Saudi
Arabia filter content that offends local religious beliefs, or political
content of which the government disapproves, such as discussions of
freedom and democracy. The sales to Iran violate U.S. export con-
trols and it is unclear how the U.S. technology came into Iranian
hands. Existing law makes ethical analysis of this case unnecessary.
The sales to China and Saudi Arabia do not violate the comprehen-
sive system of embargoes, sanctions and export controls set forth in
U.S. law, but advocacy groups and watchdog organizations have con-
demned the U.S. sellers as lacking ethics.
Assume the strongest case for the relevance of an ethical analysis,
that this is simply an unintended gap in the law which reflects no un-
derlying policy determination. First, does it matter whether the goods
are off the shelf or custom designed? It seems that the sellers know
the buyer's purpose in both cases, so this question can be set aside.
Second, what is the effect of the sales? It seems likely that some In-
ternet access is better than none at all, but assume the strongest possi-
ble case for ethics, that the sole purpose and effect of the sales is to
aid censorship and repression and that there is no question of incite-
ment to violence or other grounds that might justify the suppression of
speech under U.S. law. Third, does it matter whether the censorship is
rooted in cultural and religious concerns or whether it is politically
motivated? Given current sensibilities, perhaps a more readily ac-
ceptable rationale is based upon cultural diversity and censorship of
explicit sexual or violent content than the suppression of political dis-
course by an unelected government, though in both cases freedom of
expression has been curtailed by the government. For purposes of ar-
gument, the focus will be on the latter case since it seems the less
palatable.
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A. What is Ethically Acceptable?
The precise question is whether it is ethically acceptable for a U.S.
firm to sell goods to a foreign government, knowing that the purpose
and effect is to impede the discourse of political dissent? The Mark-
kula Center for Applied Ethics' publication, Thinking Ethically: A
Framework for Moral Decision Making'0 2 summarizes five common
approaches to moral questions.
1. The utilitarian approach
To analyze an issue using the utilitarian approach, one asks which
option will produce the greatest benefits and do the least harm. 10 3
This approach raises more questions than it answers. From whose
perspective will this be judged? Will it be that of the U.S. sellers, the
U.S. government, the foreign government, or the foreign population?
As well, how will incommensurables be balanced, real dollars to the
U.S. sellers as against the intangible cost of restricted Internet access?
2. The rights approach
The basic right is the right to dignity and to have one's choices
respected by others.'0 4 If dignity includes the right to choose freely,
then MS has the right to deal with whom it pleases. Other rights in-
clude the right to the truth, to privacy, not to be injured and to receive
what has been agreed.10 5 These are legal rights, so there is no special
ethical analysis to be done.
3. The fairness or.justice approach
This is the equal protection view, that equals should be treated
equally, that there should no favoritism or discrimination.10 6 This is
irrelevant to the case.
4. The common-good approach
Examples of the common good, general conditions that are to eve-
ryone's advantage, 0 7 include affordable health care, effective public
safety, an unpolluted environment, and world peace. It is a wonderful
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list, but seems irrelevant to the case and is not helpful in deciding
what the U.S. sellers should do.
5. The virtue approach
The virtue approach suggests that we should strive towards the ide-
als of honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, and the like. 108 This,
too, is a fine list but offers little guidance in resolving the case.
In Thinking Ethically: A Framework for Ethical Decision Making,
the Markkula Center writers suggest that in deciding how to act, a
manager must ask the following questions: Which option respects the
rights and dignity of all stakeholders; Will everyone be treated fairly;
Which option will promote the common good; But how is a business
manager to know what is best for everyone?' 0 9 It is hard enough to
figure out what is best for us or for our firm, and that is precisely what
the sellers should be thinking about.
There is short term profit to be had in the sales to countries such as
China, but are the sales in the long term economic interest of the sell-
ers? Make the case stronger still. Suppose that the seller deals in
arms. What if through a surprising gap in the law it was legal to sell
weapons to al Qaeda? If the sales present a threat to the security and
economy of the US or other principal markets, then the sales would
not be in the long term economic interest of the company and no ethi-
cal analysis is required. If the sales have no such effect, then should
the firm forego the profits because it is behaving unethically by aiding
an evil organization? Surely there is a core of universal moral wrongs
- genocide, war crimes, slavery, torture, summary execution" 0 - but
as we move away from this toward more uncertain terrain, it is unclear
why the opinions of self appointed watchdogs should be heeded. Sim-
ilar arguments have been made about firms that invest in or trade with
Israel, and there are those who seek boycotts and disinvestment be-
cause of perceived Israeli repression of Palestinians. But what one
perceives as repression may be from another perspective legitimate
measures to preserve security or social order. Who is to judge? Re-
course to the law and long term profitability penetrates the fog of
moral relativism.
108. Velasquez, Thinking Ethically, A Framework for Moral Decision Making, http://www.scu.
edu/ethics/practicing/decision/thinking.html.
109. Id.
110. These are some of the acts that constitute violations of customary international law for
purposes of the Alien Tort Claims Act. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir.
2003).
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VII. DENYING CORPORATE MANAGERS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
CARING FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
Suppose that the foregoing analysis is flawed and that neither law
nor business judgment is an adequate substitute for ethical analysis,
and that the law does not compel shareholder wealth maximization.
There are still good reasons not to entrust corporate managers with
the responsibility of caring for the public good.
The expected profit from a transaction must come to rest in some-
one's pocket. Maybe it will be paid to the workers as a better salary,
or to the stockholders as dividend or to charity as a donation, or
maybe it will not exist because a higher price for inputs has been paid
to the vendors, or because a lower price for outputs has been charged
to consumers. Doing good deeds requires money. When a business
decides that it will practice virtue, the funds for that activity must
come from somewhere, and so the question is not whether acts of
kindness ought to be done but rather who should do them, or rather
still why one should in effect be taxed so that another can act out his
moral desires.
A local grocer, for example, has signs in its stores announcing that it
takes its community responsibilities seriously. It not only complies
with law but it also performs what its managers consider to be good
deeds. But if the store concentrated on selling to customers at the
lowest possible prices, they would have more money with which to
support the causes in which they believe. Why is it desirable for the
grocer to take a bit more of its customers' money to support the
causes it likes? Milton Friedman's familiar argument - "Why should
corporations decide the charitable purposes that should be supported
by the income of their stockholders? Why shouldn't each stockholder
decide that?" '111 - applies not only to stockholders. From the point of
view of the consumer, the worker, and the vendor, there is a similar
objection to the practice of business ethics.
There are other reasons why matters of public good are more prop-
erly for the legislature to consider.112 The public interest is its reason
for being. Its members are elected by the people and are not respon-
sible to a single subset, as business managers are responsible to the
business owners. Legislators profess an oath of office and do not seek
111. Milton Friedman, The Business Community's Suicidal Impulse, 11 CATO POLICY REPORT
(March/April 1999), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy-report/v21n2/friedman.html.
112. Not all rules that govern business come from the government, but the purpose of volun-
tary self regulation is to make business more uniform, more predicable, to lower transaction
costs or to preempt threatened governmental action. The direct and intended beneficiary is
business itself.
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profits from their decisions. There is also the matter of institutional
competence. A firm may be able to calculate its own well being
("people are rational maximizers of their satisfaction"), but can it cal-
culate another's? Will it? A market economy gives an individual the
will to act (profits) and the information they need to figure out how
best to produce valuable goods and services (prices). An individual
can calculate how to act in their own self interest. But does the mar-
ketplace give them the knowledge to calculate another's best inter-
ests? Does it give them the motivation? In contrast, the state has
access to better institutional mechanisms that aggregate information,
achieve coordination, and minimize the sort of opportunism one
might expect if business managers were to become the guardians of
the public good.
People are not their brother's keepers. That is the Tragedy of the
Commons." 3 Israeli kibbutzim have reorganized themselves into cor-
porations. 114 Professions too have come to resemble ordinary busi-
nesses, motivated more by profit than concern for the client or
patient.1 -5 It is unlikely that a firm will voluntarily place itself at a
competitive disadvantage by incurring a cost associated with ethical
behavior when others in the field do not do so, unless bigger firms
attempt to promulgate rules that will disadvantage smaller competi-
tors by saddling them with costs that the larger firms can afford to
bear. (This assumes that there is no commensurate payoff from the
ethical behavior. If there is, then the ethical analysis becomes super-
fluous.) If society wants business to behave in a certain way that
escapes the discipline of the market (an externality), then it is better
to regulate by law so that all competitors are burdened
proportionately.
Here is something that I want to do, says someone in business. I
can do it lawfully and profitably. There are people who have freely
chosen to deal with me, yet someone tells me that I should not pro-
ceed because it is not "responsible." The language of ethics suggests
that you are right and I am wrong; that you speak with moral author-
ity and that you have the right to tell me how to live my life. Work to
113. The phrase is the name of an essay by Garret Hardin. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SciENce 1243 (1968). It refers to a situation wherein a commons, that is, a shared
resource, is used inefficiently because no one has any incentive to do otherwise. Id. Hardin uses
the example of a pasture open to all. Each farmer keeps adding more livestock to graze on the
Commons because it costs him nothing to do so. Id. In a few years, the soil is depleted by
overgrazing and the Commons becomes unusable. Id.
114. One example is the company Netafin.
115. Arnold S Relman, What Market Values Are Doing to Medicine, 269 THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 99 (March 1992); see ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER ch. 5 (1993).
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change the law, but do not demonize me as being greedy because I
disagree with you. This is a criticism of the way that business ethics
seems to be practiced, by rights groups that are invariably "outraged"
by their targets or by other third parties who have made a living out of
second guessing others. Business ethics is a good business to be in.
This objection assumes that there are few if any cases in which there is
but a single incontestable decision, act or outcome that is moral. Fur-
ther, it assumes that matters of ethics are usually fairly debatable,
matters about which reasonable persons may honestly disagree. It
also assumes the sort of belief that moves a judge to defer to matters
of legislative judgment.116 Finally, it assumes that even in matters of
ethics, people pursue their own self interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has dealt with one category of business ethics
problems, involving the management of an enterprise, and has tried to
show that these problems can usually be resolved without recourse to
ethical analysis. Either a proposed action conforms to law and makes
economic sense, or it does not. If it does, then there is no need to
dress it up in the language of values. If it does not, then the managers
are on a frolic, pursuing their own peculiar sense of values with other
people's money.
There is a second category of problems that have not been consid-
ered. These are the problems that concern the relationship of the in-
dividual worker to the enterprise, and involve question such as: "Is
this job right for me?", "Should I blow the whistle?", "Should I go
along to get along?" These questions concern the life of the individual
and are fundamentally of a different sort than questions that concern
the mission and operation of a for profit business enterprise in a mar-
ket economy.
How do ethical considerations differ from business judgment? How
does business ethics differ from the simple habit of taking a long
view? How often does it happen that lawful action, keyed to long run
profit maximization, will violate the prevailing ethical mindset? If
good business is good ethics, and if practices undertaken with an eye
towards long term profitability are probably good practices, then the
current emphasis on business ethics is overdone. The field is in need
of a narrowed focus. Since the emphasis should usually be on what is
116. "All three judges [Marshall, Holmes and Learned Hand] drew their theories of judicial
restraint from their skepticism that those in power possess some ultimate truth." Sandra Day
O'Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 9
(1990).
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best for the company, the teachers and writers of business ethics
should be experienced managers. They should know how to run a
business.
Even if there is no real domain for the business ethicists, is there
any harm in pursuing the discipline, assuming that it is properly fo-
cused on matters that are not solved by law? The answer may depend
on why companies talk about ethics, responsibility and values, as well
as compliance with law. It may be that people just do not like lawyers
and laws, thinking them to be too technical, too crabbed, and too un-
fair. It may be that they think a virtuous man to be better somehow
than one who is merely law abiding, although presumably most peo-
ple would be satisfied if the large public companies would follow the
law and tell the truth, and if their officers would follow the law and
not steal from the company. It may be that people find the law to be
unclear and incomplete, but lawyers often know how to fill the gaps
with legal reasoning. The tradition is richer than laypeople may un-
derstand. Perhaps it is just more fun to talk about values than law and
economics, but as a teacher of law, the concern is that values talk may
displace the richness of the legal system, based on centuries of real
cases, with a fullness and detail of fact unmatched by theorists, 117 and
informed by the practical wisdom of those who have lived in the
law. 118
117. Posner, supra note 18, at 1699.
118. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 115.
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